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There is a profound and ongoing debate in 
psychology on how humans face a complex 
task as probabilistic reasoning. The birth of 
an idea that is still prevalent and is one of 
the cornerstones of this debate could be 
placed at the time of the Enlightenment, in 
the early eighteenth century. By then, rea-
son was considered a tool with admirable 
precision that, when properly trained, was 
capable of giving (objective) access to the 
marvels of the universe. The value given to 
the reason of those that mastered his secrets 
reached the point where, when discrepan-
cies arose between probability theory and 
the judgment of the wise men, the theo-
ries were changed (Hacking, 1975; Daston, 
1980).
Years passed, and after the birth of exper-
imental psychology, the trickle of contra-
dictory results between what was expected 
by the theories and the actual people’s 
behavior began to be difficult to ignore. 
An alternative vision appeared and placed 
its focus away from the potentially perfect 
enlightened reason, paying more attention 
to its limits. The mind started to be seen as 
a general purpose information processing 
machine, but with limitations (e.g., working 
memory). Evidence emerged of different 
types of bias, cognitive shortcuts (heuris-
tics) and, therefore, normative models of 
human behavior had to include amend-
ments that remove them from the mathe-
matical or statistical perfection of yesteryear. 
An example of bias on a simple principle is 
the Conjunction Fallacy. Obviously if we 
compare p(A) with p(A and B) the prob-
ability of the latter cannot exceed that of 
the former. However, under certain circum-
stances people seem to skip this principle. 
The best known example (from Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974) showed how after a 
description of a progressive (feminist-like) 
person people judged the sentence “Linda 
is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement” as greater than that of “Linda is 
a bank teller” as a description of Linda. The 
line of work behind much of these results, 
called Heuristics and Biases (e.g., Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974, 1983), earned a Nobel 
Prize to Daniel Kahneman.
But the dispute wasn’t settled. In 
response to the above vision emerged a 
group that emphasized a different place, the 
second blade of Simon’s scissors: the outside 
world (Gigerenzer et al., 1988; Gigerenzer, 
1991, 1993; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996). For 
Herbert Simon, when studying human cog-
nition it is meaningless to consider only the 
mind. Like scissors are just a useless piece 
of metal in the absence of one of the blades, 
ignoring the world around us makes futile 
any effort to understand the intimate secrets 
of cognition, as it is a reflection of a sub-
tle dance between mind and environment 
(Simon, 1990, p. 7).
Ecological Rationality proposed an alter-
native to the vision of the mind as a general 
purpose information processing machine. 
They suggested that the mind was in fact a 
set of tools designed by natural selection to 
deal with different aspects of reality. So the 
limitations became opportunities thanks 
to natural selection. From the Ecological 
Rationality point of view, phylogenetic 
history shaped us using the environment 
as a canvas, filling the gaps with adaptive 
functions (through algorithms or special-
ized modules) that provide well-adjusted 
answers (Brase and Barbey, 2006). One 
of the most important conclusions to be 
drawn from this view is that when study-
ing the mind, paying attention to the world 
around is not only very useful, but probably 
essential, since regularities in its structure 
allows us to infer the domains for which 
there is cognitive adaptations (Todd and 
Gigerenzer, 2000, 2002, 2007).
From these very sensible ideas, an 
important amount of research designed 
to show various sides of the influence of 
the environment on the human mind and 
our behavior has been conducted. Studies 
appeared highlighting the improved per-
formance in probabilistic problems using 
natural frequencies instead of probabilities 
of simple events (5 out of 20 instead of 25%; 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995). Others on 
how the Recognition Heuristic (Pachur 
et al., 2011) may lie behind decision-mak-
ing mechanisms like Take The Best (TTB), 
which using only the first discriminative 
clue is able to outperform more complex 
tools such as Artificial Neural Networks 
(Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000), etc.
A substantial part of the strength of 
evolutionary arguments lies in the intuitive 
appeal they have. The cases discussed above, 
both the issue of representation format 
(natural frequencies versus probabilities) 
and decision heuristics like TTB, are good 
examples of evolutionary arguments. In the 
first case, the view that there is a modular 
adaptation, heuristic, or any other sort of 
specific brain machinery to process proba-
bilistic information in the form of natural 
frequencies rather than probabilities, is 
based on empirical results from a particu-
lar type of problem showing that people 
understand frequentist information better 
and make more precise calculations based 
on it (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995). The 
intuitively impeccable idea that throughout 
our evolutionary history we have been sur-
rounded by simple events (from which the 
natural frequencies arise) and not probabil-
ities, as they are a relatively recent invention, 
supported these results.
But science does not advance, exclusively, 
on the shoulders of bright intuitively impec-
cable ideas. These ideas and experiments 
supporting them must be tested, repli-
cated, understood, dissected, etc. And the 
intuitions have to be supported empirically 
beyond doubt. It is in this process where 
Ecological Rationality has shown a less 
impeccable profile, using hypotheses gener-
ated by evolutionary arguments in the dem-
onstration plane. Based on a more complete 
understanding and manipulation of the 
classic experiments and on a few new ones, 
more simple alternative hypotheses have 
emerged. And they do not appeal to mecha-
nisms related to evolution (e.g., Lesage et al., 
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the actual mind and this is a task for the 
empirical testing. Nonetheless, not only 
evolutionary hypotheses must be subjected 
to such scrutiny. Any assumptions, scien-
tific, or otherwise, should be challenged, 
reviewed, understood and shredded. This 
is how good science is done and, in general, 
moves forward as toward a more complete 
and accurate understanding of the world.
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level   cognition. The modules, as defined 
by Fodor, are I/O low level black boxes 
and anything related to reasoning, proba-
bilistic, or otherwise, wouldn’t fit inside. 
Reasoning requires the participation of 
multiple complex systems and it is, almost 
by definition, the opposite of what a proper 
Fodorian module should be (Fodor, 1983, 
2000). Of course, other relatively recent 
modularity explanations are less restrictive 
regarding the criteria for modules (Barrett 
and Kurzban, 2006). As an example, a suc-
cessful alternative approach to modular-
ity would be the one that crystallized on 
ACT-R (Anderson, 1990; Anderson et al., 
2004). What distinguishes ACT-R is its focus 
on the integration of cognition (see also, 
Newell, 1990), as it is focused on developing 
a general theory of cognition. A critical dis-
tinction with Ecological Rationality is the 
generality of the functioning of the mod-
ules. ACT-R claims more general oriented 
modules (e.g., the perceptual modules) 
and Ecological Rationality proposes more 
specific modules (e.g., natural frequencies 
module). Finally, contrary to Ecological 
Rationality, ACT-R foundations are not 
linked to human evolution in a critical way.
Although it is possible that the envi-
ronment shapes the mind, at least to some 
extent, the evolutionary hypothesis should 
always be regarded with greater skepticism, 
least we cut ourselves with Simon’s scis-
sors (Buss et al., 1998). The evolutionary 
plausibility of mechanisms based on the 
human ability to adapt to the environment 
it is a phenomenal source for new ideas 
and hypothesis but it shouldn’t be used 
as a way to demonstrate the same ideas 
it helps generate. The specific problems 
which could have faced the human mind 
in the Pleistocene are candidates to hypoth-
esize mental mechanisms. However, some 
restrictions should be taken into account: 
first, not any kind of mechanism is possi-
ble in the human mind. The mind as any 
evolved machinery includes restrictions 
and not any useful tool should become a 
reality (wheels are useful for locomotion 
in some conditions but evolution preferred 
legs). Also, some problems are intractable 
for a modular specific mechanism because 
they need to allow for the context to be 
checked (that includes any task facing 
the frame problem; McCarthy and Hayes, 
1969). And, of course, once demonstrated 
that a mechanism is possible it should still 
unpublished data; for a review, see Barbey 
and Sloman, 2007). These hypotheses talk 
about the structure of information, arith-
metic complexity, cognitive resources, etc. 
Although some of these ideas where present 
in a more rudimentary shape in the original 
work of the Ecological Rationality propo-
nents, the alternatives are much more com-
plete and explain, in a simpler way (no need 
for evolutionary cover-stories), a wider phe-
nomenon. Occam would be proud.
We also used before an example about 
how, from evolutionist positions, it is 
argued that certain innate heuristic deci-
sion mechanisms perform better than more 
complex and less efficient ones. Again, the 
explanation used regarding the origin of 
these systems has to do with untestable evo-
lutionary hypotheses. And again, empiri-
cal evidence showed how the advantage of 
these heuristic mechanisms is minimal and 
occurs in very specific types of problems, 
and that, tools like Nearest Neighbor or 
Neural Networks, when properly used, can 
produce equal or superior results (Chater 
et al., 2003). These kinds of algorithms 
are related to our empirical knowledge of 
human learning rather than phylogenetic 
postulates.
The above examples are maybe just 
hand-picked representatives from a large 
battle being waged between supporters of a 
vision focused on the biases and limitations 
of the human mind, and supporters of an 
approach that stresses the need for a more 
ecological experimentation in natural con-
texts, given that it is likely that the human 
mind has adapted to them over our evolu-
tionary history. Both positions are probably 
partly right and valuable. The approach of 
ecological rationality, or generally those 
that seek answers beyond the present, can 
be very useful but it’s easy to end up in the 
alley of bad science if used incorrectly. On 
the other hand, the positions based, mostly, 
on finding faults can become too opportun-
istic, and their empirical testing be artificial 
in excess (Cohen, 1981), forgetting the over-
all objective, which is to understand how 
the mind works.
The modular view of the mind used in the 
last few years by Evolutionary Psychology 
in general, and Ecological Rationality in 
particular, has become a widespread cliché 
to explain complex cognitive phenom-
enon. Fodor himself warned against an 
excessive use of modules to explain high 
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